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11 Aug

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CODEWORD ROUTING SHEET

TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief, S/CST	[illegible]	11 Aug 60
2	Chief, D/S	[illegible]	11 Aug 60
3	Chief, ERA	[illegible]	11 Aug 60
4	~~AD/RR~~		
5	DD/I Attn: Mr. Komer, 344 Admin.		
6			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1			
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_____Approval _____Information _____Signature

_____Action _____Direct Reply _____Return

_____Comment _____Preparation of Reply _____Dispatch

_____Concurrence _____Recommendation _____File

REMARKS:

5-588

1 copy filed in 5-588 file

APPENDED DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWORD MATERIAL

Appended document contains classified information within the meaning of Section 798, Title 18, United States Code.

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

Summary

In comparison with the United States, the USSR exhibits considerably more civil defense activity. A nation-wide Soviet staff structure exists under central direction. Survival training has been increasing and it is probable that 50-80,000,000 people have had some civil defense instruction (compared with about 5,000,000 in the U.S.) The character of new Soviet housing -- large masonry apartment houses -- facilitates the preparation of basement shelter space with a better degree of radiation attenuation and better fire resisting qualities than is possible in the common type of U.S. housing. Although the state of equipment and furnishing may vary, it is estimated that the USSR has basement shelter space in masonry buildings for about 15,000,000 persons. To this capability must be added space for about 2,000,000 in Soviet subways and 2,000,000 in independent air raid shelters. The latter are reported in increasing numbers. For those without formal shelter, civil defense courses include instruction in the building of earth-covered, field-type shelters.

A priority system in terms of better shelter and earlier preparation is discernible in the USSR for the protection of control personnel, and personnel of important communications, transport and industrial installations.

Reporting for the past two years indicates continued construction of air raid shelters in the USSR, increased training and drills for both the general population and specialized groups, and the introduction of a strategic, urban evacuation concept. The latter, coming at this time, implies that the USSR civil defense planner feels assured of some warning time in terms of hours if not days.

Other nations of the Soviet Bloc have also made civil defense preparations. Those most similar to the USSR include Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

1. Characteristics.

Since World War II, the official USSR view has been that civil defense is a necessary measure. This has been underlined since 1955 by statements of leading marshalls, by writings of military theoreticians stressing the importance of "rear area" defense, and by an expanded civil defense training program. Soviet civil defense literature stresses the possibility of attack directed against centers of population and industry.

Several factors tend to facilitate civil defense preparation and operation in the USSR: (a) the regimentation of the people should tend to insure discipline in an emergency; (b) central control of civil defense acts toward assuring consistent planned development; (c) there is a legal compulsion to serve in civil defense; (d) the characteristics of most new urban housing -- in large masonry apartments -- permit the preparation of basement fallout shelter areas with a good level of radiation attenuation, and reduces fire hazards; (e) although not severely tried in World War II, the USSR acquired at that time some practical operational experience in civil defense; and (f) in the event that chemical and biological agents become more accepted means of warfare, the USSR has the advantage of some preliminary preparations. Civil defense training in the USSR has already introduced biological and chemical defense subjects.

Soviet civil defense operates under security restrictions. A great deal of information, on the level of what the individual citizen needs to know, is disseminated through pamphlets, a specialized periodical press, and in training courses. Plans, the level of civil defense supply, the amount of shelter prepared, and the status of civil defense organizations above the basic "self-defense" group are not publicized. Full information on nuclear weapons effects has been generally withheld from the public, probably with the intention of preventing undue alarm. The public is, however, given detailed behavior instructions and assured that proper civil defense preparations will substantially reduce casualties, even under conditions of nuclear warfare.

It is clear that the USSR uses a priority system in civil defense preparations; earliest training and supply, and heavier shelters are developed for more important cities and for more important installations. (Such as those for government, communications, and for major factories.)

Popular level training is aimed at the entire adult population, and it is being made increasingly compulsory.

Soviet civil defense preparations are long-term; they have been carried on for over ten years with continuous, if sometimes uneven, development.

2. Achievements.

The USSR has a widespread, specialized civil defense officer staff, assigned at all levels of government. A universal, popular level training program for the Soviet public, which includes instruction in defense against chemical, bacteriological, and atomic weapons, has been programmed since 1955. In spite of difficulties, it is estimated that most of the urban population (50-80,000,000 people) have been exposed to training programs and perhaps 10,000,000 have attained a degree of proficiency. City and factory drills are being held for operative unit training. Older students in Soviet schools are being organized and trained for post-attack rescue and first-aid work.

The Soviets have been preparing shelter space since about 1949. Since that time they may have provided basement shelter space for about 15,000,000 urban residents during the construction of new masonry buildings. It is believed that most basement shelters provide good attenuation of residual radiation (fallout) but that they are not highly blast resistant. Soviet subways could shelter about 2,000,000 people and detached shelters (usually underground) may be sufficient to shelter 2,000,000 or more control personnel and workers in important industry.

The status of civil defense supply is not sufficiently known. Some operative groups have performed drills using equipment which included radiological monitoring instruments. A civilian gas mask which provides excellent protection against all standard war gases, known biological agents, and radioactive dust, appeared several years ago. It has not been generally issued.

Information on the Soviet civil defense warning system is inadequate. However, sirens are reported to have been mounted and tested in several cities. The need for a Conelrad-type radio broadcasting system is not critical because the majority of Soviet so-called "radios" are actually wired loud-speakers which will be used for disseminating pre-attack alerts and instructions to the population.

3. Nuclear Defense.

It can be deduced that Soviet civil defense planning, since about 1955, has been altered to include considerations of nuclear defense and protection from fallout. Evidence includes changed civil defense instructions and tactics, the addition of blast traps and dust filters to air raid shelter designs, and the addition of an anti-dust filter to the civilian gas mask. Instructions for those using air raid shelters include the injunction to stay in shelter after nuclear attack and not to come out until word is received from the Soviet civil defense authorities. Thus, if the radiation level is high, citizens will be obligated to remain where protection is best.

Tacit admission of the increased vulnerability of cities has been evident in the Soviet consideration of evacuation and dispersal. Two types of urban evacuation have been mentioned in Soviet civil defense literature. One is the evacuation of city civil defense forces to peripheral areas where they are to be "sheltered" for use in post-attack operations. The other is a strategic evacuation of non-essential elements of the population from likely target areas. The latter is a recently emerging concept. Accomplished arrangements or practice for such an evacuation have not been reported. (A few reports from the USSR and the European Satellites, suggest that up to 75 percent urban evacuation may be planned.)

Soviet leaders have occasionally noted with some satisfaction that the USSR's population and industry is more widely dispersed than that of the U.S. It is possible this advantage will be maintained or increased by (1) developing

of new centers in Siberia, (2) by implementing the "satellite city" program around larger urban centers, and (3) by attempting to enforce defense norms requiring minimum distances between newly constructed industry and populated areas, and between new industry and existing factories or transport installations.

4. New Developments in Soviet Civil Defense.

Several other changes in Soviet civil defense in recent years appear worthy of note.

The subordination of the Soviet civil defense (MPVO) staff has not been clarified since the MVD was abolished in January 1960.

Since 1955, fewer basements but heavier basement shelters and increasing numbers of detached underground shelters have been reported in the USSR, some of the latter by reliable Western observers. (This suggests a possibility that fewer but stronger shelters are being prepared in Soviet cities and this program may be combined with a strategic evacuation potential.) Repatriates of several nationalities continue to report air raid shelter construction, of both the basement type and the independent underground shelters in factory areas.

Popular level civil defense training continues to be a major preoccupation of DOSAAF, the Soviet paramilitary society. Starting in 1955, three courses have been given. (Anti-atomic Defense; Anti-air Defense; and Ready for Air Defense, First Grade.) First projected for completion "by 1960", a recent publication indicates that completion of the third course by 1961 will now be satisfactory. A fourth course, (Ready for Air Defense, Second Grade) is being initiated, probably in areas and factories which have largely completed the first three courses. During these courses of instruction, more emphasis is now being placed on practical exercises and testing.

City and factory civil defense exercises have been reported with increasing frequency since 1957. In most city drills, the population has taken little part, except to get off the street and comply with blackout precautions. These exercises, therefore, take on the character of blackout and staff exercises, rather than full-scale drills.

A variety of reports, including those describing exercises, indicate that some civil defense supplies have been issued, and that larger shelters have been equipped and stocked in some cases.